For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear posture has been defined by a single, overriding concern: India. The two neighbors have fought multiple wars, engaged in a continuous low-level conflict in Kashmir, and maintain massive conventional armies facing each other across a tense border. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at around 170 warheads as of January 2025, has been developed explicitly to offset India’s larger conventional military . Its longest-range tested missile, the Shaheen-III, with a range of 2,750 kilometers, is designed to reach all of mainland India, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where India could base strategic assets . So when US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified before the Senate that Pakistan may be moving toward intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability capable of striking US territory, analysts were left with a puzzling question: why would a nation whose strategic focus is entirely on its eastern neighbor develop weapons that can reach across oceans to strike the United States? This explainer examines the evidence, the possible motivations, and what Pakistan’s potential ICBM pursuit might mean for regional and global security.
What Did US Intelligence Actually Say About Pakistan’s ICBM Ambitions?
In her March 2026 testimony before the US Senate, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated that Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missiles that “potentially could include ICBMs” capable of striking US territory . While she did not specify timelines, locations, or operational status, her assessment placed Pakistan alongside China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as states developing missile delivery systems with nuclear or conventional payloads .
This assessment is part of a broader intelligence community projection that the number of missiles threatening the US could increase to more than 16,000 by 2035, up from more than 3,000 currently . The report also indicated that such states are likely to study US missile defense plans to shape their own missile development and evaluate US deterrence intentions, highlighting growing concern in Washington over expanding missile threats to the homeland .
The evidence cited by analysts includes US sanctions on Pakistan’s National Defence Complex and Chinese suppliers linked to composite materials, filament-winding machines, mandrels, and inspection systems associated with large solid-rocket motors . Satellite imagery also shows a new, larger horizontal motor test stand at Attock built between 2021 and late 2023, suggesting the ability to test larger rocket motors, though their ultimate purpose remains unclear . As Timothy Wright of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted, available evidence points to emerging developments but remains inconclusive .
Why Would Pakistan Need ICBMs Against India?
Pakistan’s existing missile arsenal is already sufficient to cover all of India. The Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile, the longest-range system Islamabad has tested, has a range of 2,750 kilometers . From launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad, this range can reach all of mainland India. Even the more distant Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which India could develop as strategic bases, can be targeted if the missile is launched from eastern Pakistan near the Indian border .
In addition to land-based systems, Pakistan continues to develop a nascent nuclear triad comprising aircraft, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles . The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute notes that ongoing development of delivery systems and the accumulation of fissile material suggest Pakistan’s arsenal could expand over the coming decade .
Given this India-centric posture, an ICBM program would represent a significant and puzzling shift. Such systems would be unnecessary for deterring India—they would be vastly overkill in range and would consume resources that could otherwise be used to maintain and expand India-focused capabilities. This suggests that if Pakistan is indeed pursuing ICBMs, its strategic calculus has expanded beyond its traditional focus.
Could US Actions Against Iran Be Driving Pakistan’s Calculations?
The June 2025 US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have fundamentally altered Pakistan’s threat perception. As Marcus Andreopoulos of the Royal Society of Asian Affairs noted, those strikes heightened nuclear anxieties in Pakistan, which could accelerate Pakistan’s long-range missile program and the potential development of intercontinental capabilities .
Pakistan has reason to be concerned about US action against its nuclear arsenal. During the US War in Afghanistan, Washington downplayed Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network because Islamabad was a key partner in counterterrorism efforts . As Chilamkuri Mohan of the National University of Singapore observed, those constraints appear less relevant after the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021 . With US and Israeli concerns about Iran’s nuclear development rising, there may be an increase in punitive actions against countries and groups that support Iran’s advancement .
The US strikes on Iran demonstrated that Washington is willing to use military force against nuclear facilities when it perceives a threat. For Pakistani strategists, this precedent would be alarming. If the US could strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, what would prevent it from doing the same to Pakistan? An ICBM capability that could reach the US homeland would fundamentally alter that calculation—it would give Pakistan a deterrent against US action, not just Indian action.
How Does China Fit Into Pakistan’s Calculus?
China’s longstanding support for Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs adds another layer of complexity. As Andreopoulos noted, Pakistan’s growing dependence on China raises questions about its strategic autonomy amid rising US–China tensions . Beijing has been a consistent supplier of technology and materials that Pakistan cannot obtain elsewhere.
US sanctions on Chinese suppliers linked to Pakistan’s missile program reflect Washington’s concern about this relationship. The sanctions target composite materials, filament-winding machines, and other components essential for large solid-rocket motors . If Pakistan is developing ICBMs, it would almost certainly require continued Chinese cooperation, deepening Islamabad’s dependence on Beijing.
This creates a complex dynamic. Pakistan may be pursuing longer-range capabilities partly in response to US actions against Iran, but doing so requires deeper ties with China, which in turn increases US concern about both countries. The triangular relationship could become self-reinforcing: US pressure pushes Pakistan toward China, which prompts more US pressure, which further consolidates the Pakistan-China axis.
What Strategic Purpose Would an ICBM Serve?
If Pakistan is indeed developing ICBMs, the most plausible explanation is a shift in deterrence posture from India-centric to US-hedging. By acquiring the ability to strike the US homeland, Pakistan would gain a deterrent against American intervention in South Asian conflicts or against US attacks on its nuclear infrastructure.
This would represent a significant evolution in Pakistan’s nuclear strategy. Historically, Pakistan’s nuclear signaling has been less about directly deterring India and more about manipulating crisis dynamics to draw in the US as a restraining force . As Siddhant Kishore argued in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Pakistan’s nuclear posture functions as a tool of third-party coercion to offset India’s conventional military advantage . The deliberate cultivation of uncertainty—about red lines, escalation thresholds, and capabilities—is central to this strategy.
An ICBM capability would extend this logic to the US. By creating uncertainty about whether it could strike the American homeland, Pakistan would gain leverage over Washington’s crisis decision-making. The US would have to factor Pakistan’s potential retaliation into any calculation about intervening in South Asian conflicts or attacking Pakistani facilities.
The ambiguity surrounding Pakistan’s missile development may serve a secondary purpose: maintaining the US as a stabilizing force. If Pakistan can credibly signal that it might escalate to intercontinental ranges, Washington may be more inclined to restrain India and manage crises before they spiral out of control. In this sense, even the possibility of an ICBM program serves strategic purposes regardless of whether actual deployment occurs.
What Are the Risks and Implications?
A Pakistani ICBM program, if realized, would have profound implications for regional and global security. It would introduce a new nuclear dimension to US-Pakistan relations, which have already been strained by Pakistan’s ties to China and its role in Afghanistan. It would raise the stakes of any South Asian crisis, as the US would now potentially be within Pakistan’s range. And it would likely trigger a response from India, which might accelerate its own long-range programs, sparking a new arms race.
For the US, a Pakistani ICBM capability would pose a direct homeland threat that cannot be ignored. Washington would face difficult choices: engage in arms control negotiations with a country it does not trust, expand missile defense systems at significant cost, or consider preemptive action—each option with its own risks and drawbacks.
For Pakistan, the pursuit of ICBMs would be enormously costly. It would consume resources needed for India-focused deterrence, invite sanctions and isolation, and potentially provoke US action before the capability becomes operational. It could also accelerate India’s own strategic programs, creating the very threat spiral Pakistan seeks to avoid.
Yet for Pakistani strategists who witnessed the US strikes on Iran, the calculus may be different. A nuclear arsenal that cannot reach the US homeland is vulnerable to US attack. An ICBM capability that can hold American cities at risk fundamentally changes that vulnerability. In a world where the US has demonstrated its willingness to use force against nuclear facilities, Pakistan may conclude that the cost of ICBM development is worth the insurance it provides.
Conclusion
The evidence that Pakistan is developing ICBM capability remains circumstantial and inconclusive. The new test stand at Attock, the sanctions on suppliers, and the intelligence community’s warnings all point to emerging capabilities, but hard evidence of a dedicated ICBM program is lacking. It is possible that Pakistan is simply upgrading its medium-range capabilities, and that US intelligence is overreading ambiguous indicators.
Yet the possibility alone has strategic significance. Even if Pakistan never deploys an ICBM, the perception that it might do so—and the uncertainty about its intentions—serves deterrence purposes. By keeping Washington guessing, Pakistan gains leverage it would not have if its capabilities were transparent and India-focused.
What is clear is that the strategic environment has changed. US strikes on Iran, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and rising US-China tensions have all altered Pakistan’s threat calculus. The country that once relied on US restraint in South Asia may now be seeking a direct deterrent against US action. Whether that deterrent takes the form of ICBMs or some other capability remains to be seen. But the direction of travel is unmistakable: Pakistan is moving beyond an India-centric posture toward a more complex strategic calculus that includes hedging against US power. For the United States, this development raises questions that go beyond missile ranges and warhead counts. If Pakistan is the enemy, why does it need ICBMs? The answer may be that it no longer sees India as its only enemy, or even its most dangerous one. That shift, if confirmed, would be one of the most significant strategic developments in South Asia in decades.
