A Regime Falls, But Who Really Wins?
Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria is over—at least on paper. The country’s new Islamist leadership, spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is already being hailed as a victory by Turkey’s ruling elite. But in reality, this is just the latest chapter in a power struggle where no one is truly in control. And the usual suspects—Turkey, the Gulf monarchies, Israel, Iran, Russia, and the U.S.—are still playing their favorite game: deciding Syria’s fate without asking Syrians.
The Turkish government, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has long viewed Assad’s downfall as an opportunity. To them, it’s more than just a geopolitical shift—it’s a chance to carve out a greater Turkish sphere of influence. But that dream is easier sold to domestic audiences than it is realized on the battlefield. Syria remains a fractured, complex puzzle, and Turkey’s newfound confidence doesn’t change the fact that the Kurdish presence in northern Syria remains a thorn in Ankara’s side. Nor does it erase the conflicting ambitions of Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and Russia.
The Old Order’s Balancing Act
Turkey’s pre-Erdoğan establishment, made up of conservative center-rightists and staunch Kemalists, had a clear doctrine: keep Syria intact and maintain regional stability. Even as tensions flared—over everything from Kurdish insurgencies to water disputes—Ankara and Damascus managed to maintain an uneasy peace. That changed when Turkey’s ruling party decided that Syria needed a more ‘acceptable’ government—one that aligned with its vision of Sunni conservatism.
This wasn’t a sudden shift. Turkey’s ties with Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood go back decades, culminating in the infamous 1982 Hama uprising, where Assad’s forces crushed the Brotherhood’s rebellion with brutal force. But even after that bloodbath, the two nations found a way to coexist—until the Arab uprisings of 2010–13 threw everything into chaos.
Initially, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) played the game cautiously. Yes, they had Islamist roots, but they were also pragmatists. For years, they used soft power—business ties, cultural diplomacy, and economic influence—to push their agenda. Openly backing Islamist factions in Syria would have been too risky. At least, until they sensed that the tides were turning.
The Unholy Marriage of Neo-Ottomanism and Fascism
Turkey’s foreign policy has always been a messy cocktail of ideologies, but never more so than in the past decade. The AKP’s Islamism is often presented as a stark contrast to Turkey’s secular Kemalist tradition, yet the two have increasingly converged. Erdoğan’s government, despite its religious rhetoric, has been happy to collaborate with secular nationalists when it serves their interests. The so-called “Eurasianists” within Turkey’s establishment—who advocate closer ties with Russia, China, and Central Asia—were at odds with Erdoğan in the early 2000s, but that relationship has since evolved into an uneasy partnership.
The defining feature of this new bloc? A shared hostility towards the Kurds.
For years, Turkey’s relationship with Syria was shaped by its obsession with containing Kurdish aspirations. Assad himself played the Kurdish card when it suited him—allowing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to operate training camps in Syria, even as he cracked down on Kurdish activists at home. But in 1998, Assad changed course, expelling PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and paving the way for a brief period of cooperation between Damascus and Ankara. That cooperation fell apart when the Syrian civil war erupted, and Turkey saw an opportunity to reshape the region.
The Syrian Proxy War: Who’s Really in Charge?
Turkey’s involvement in Syria has been defined by shifting alliances and contradictory policies. At first, Erdoğan backed the Muslim Brotherhood, believing they could establish a friendly Islamist government in Syria. When that failed, his administration pivoted towards more extreme factions—jihadi groups that were willing to fight both Assad and the Kurds. The Gulf monarchies and Saudi Arabia initially had more sway over these Sunni militant factions, but by 2020, Turkey had secured a foothold in Idlib, positioning itself as the dominant foreign power in Syria’s northwest.
Of course, the region’s many factions don’t always play by the script. While the Turkish-controlled Syrian National Army (SNA) focused on fighting the Kurds, HTS was busy setting up its own Islamic mini-state. Unlike the SNA, which operated as a proxy for Ankara, HTS maintained a degree of independence. But as Turkey’s influence grew, HTS found itself increasingly aligned with Erdoğan’s vision.
The Coup That Changed Everything
A critical turning point came in 2016, when a failed coup attempt in Turkey reshaped the country’s political landscape. Erdoğan responded by purging his former allies in the Gülen movement and forging new alliances with the very military factions he once opposed. This included nationalist hardliners and remnants of the old Kemalist establishment, who, despite their ideological differences, shared Erdoğan’s vision of expanding Turkish influence.
The result was a more aggressive foreign policy—one that prioritized military intervention over diplomacy. Turkey’s Syria policy shifted from one of calculated opportunism to full-blown expansionism. No longer content with merely supporting proxies, Turkey began pushing for direct control over Syrian territories. Erdoğan’s government justified this on multiple fronts: countering Kurdish separatism, securing energy routes, and asserting Turkey’s dominance in the Muslim world.
The Refugee Backlash and Turkey’s Political Divide
Back home, Turkey’s involvement in Syria hasn’t exactly been a crowd-pleaser. While Erdoğan’s supporters frame the intervention as a bold assertion of Turkish power, the opposition sees it as a disaster. The biggest source of contention? The refugee crisis.
Millions of Syrians have fled to Turkey, fueling resentment and political divisions. The opposition—led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and far-right factions—has seized on anti-refugee sentiment, blaming Erdoğan’s Syria policy for Turkey’s economic woes. The result? A race to the bottom, where political parties compete to see who can be the most hostile towards Syrian refugees.
For now, the government is trying to spin the fall of Assad as a victory—an opportunity to resettle refugees and stabilize Syria under Turkish influence. But the reality on the ground tells a different story. Clashes between Turkish-backed forces and Kurdish fighters continue daily, with hundreds killed in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Ankara’s crackdown on Kurdish politicians, journalists, and activists within Turkey has intensified. The message is clear: Kurdish autonomy remains the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s ambitions in Syria.
What Happens Next?
The overthrow of Assad has changed the power dynamics in Syria, but it hasn’t ended the conflict. Turkey’s intervention has reshaped the battlefield, but it has also created new enemies and new risks. The Kurdish resistance isn’t going anywhere. The Gulf monarchies and Israel still have their own stakes in Syria. And Russia, despite its tactical retreats, remains a key player in the region.
For now, Erdoğan may celebrate Syria as a foreign policy success, but history has a way of humbling leaders who overreach. As Syria’s new Islamist rulers struggle to govern, and as Turkey’s economy groans under the weight of war and sanctions, the cracks in Erdoğan’s grand strategy may soon begin to show. And when that happens, the real question won’t be who controls Syria—but whether Turkey itself is prepared for the consequences of its own imperial ambitions.
